Thursday, October 3, 2019
The role of Intelligence in the formulation of government policies Essay Example for Free
The role of Intelligence in the formulation of government policies Essay Introduction Espionage is the secret collection of information, or intelligence, that the source of such information wishes to protect from disclosure. Intelligence refers to evaluated and processed information needed to make decisions. The term can be used with reference to business, military, economic, or political decisions, but it most commonly relates to governmental foreign and defense policy. Intelligence generally has a national security connotation and therefore exists in an aura of secrecy.            Espionage, or spying, is illegal according to national laws. Spying proceeds against the attempts of counter-espionage (or counter-intelligence) agencies to protect the secrecy of the information desired.            International espionage methods and operations have few boundaries. They have been romanticized in popular fiction and the mass media, but in reality, espionage exists in a secret world of deception, fraud, and sometimes violence. Espionage involves the recruiting of agents in foreign nations; efforts to encourage the disloyalty of those possessing significant information; and audio surveillance as well as the use of a full range of modern photographic, sensing, and detection devices and other techniques of eliciting secret information (see C. S. Trahair, Richard. Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies and Secret Operations, 2004).            The intents of this paper are to: (1) trace how espionage started; (2) know the justification and international sanction of intelligence; (3) know the recruitment agents; (4) be aware how espionages are gathered; (5) be acquainted espionage agencies and networks; (6) be informed how espionage during the 19th century and early 20th century; (7) know the role of espionage during World War II and Modern Era; (8) realized how is espionage in politics and industry; (9) learn about the Espionage Act of 1917; (10) know about Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as one of the agencies of intelligence and; (11) know about its implications of modern technology. Background How espionage started?            Intelligence was early recognized as a vital tool of statecraftâ€â€of diplomacy or war. Writing almost 2,500 years ago, the Chinese military theorist Sunzi stressed the importance of intelligence. His book The Art of War (c. 500 BC) gave detailed instructions for organizing an espionage system that would include double agents and defectors. Intelligence, however, was haphazardly organized by rulers and military chiefs until the rise of nationalism in the 18th century and the growth of standing armies and diplomacy (see T. Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. 1999). III. Discussion Justification and International Sanction of Intelligence            In order to adopt and implement foreign policy, plan military strategy and organize armed forces, conduct diplomacy, negotiate arms control agreements, or participate in international organization activities, nations have vast information requirements. Not surprisingly, many governments maintain some kind of intelligence capability as a matter of survival in a world where dangers and uncertainties still exist. The cold war may have ended, but hostilities continue in parts of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Indeed, the collapse of old political blocs in the late 1980s has even increased international uncertainty and consequent need for information (see Carney, Ralph M. Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal. 2001).            All nations have laws against espionage, but most sponsor spies in other lands. Because of the clandestine nature of espionage, no reliable count exists of how many intelligence officersâ€â€only a small percentage of whom are actually spiesâ€â€there are in the world. A common estimate is that the United States today still employs some 200,000 intelligence personnel. The number that was generally ascribed to the Soviet intelligence establishment in the 1980s was 400,000, a figure that included border guards and internal security police (see T. Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. 1999). The recruitment agents            Today, scores of developed nations have efficient intelligence organizations with systematic programmes for recruiting new agents. Agents come from three main sources: the university world, where students are sought and trained for intelligence careers; the armed services and police forces, where some degree of intelligence proficiency may already have been attained; and the underground world of espionage, which produces an assortment of people, including criminal informers, with relevant experience (see Bungert, Heike Et Al. Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. 2003).            Those who do the actual spying, which may involve stealing information or performing disloyal acts of disclosure, are led to this work by various motivations. Greed or financial need is a leading incentive in many cases, but other motivations, such as ambition, political ideology, or nationalistic idealism, can figure importantly: Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky, a highly placed Soviet officer, provided valuable information to Western intelligence services in the belief that the West must be warned of danger. H. A. R. (â€Å"Kim†) Philby, the notorious English spy, worked for the Soviet Union on ideological grounds.            Some spies must be carefully recruited and enticed into cooperation; others volunteer. The latter must be handled with extreme caution, as it is common for double agents to be among the volunteers. Double agents are spies who pretend to be defecting, but in reality maintain their original loyalty. Counter-intelligence staffs are always sceptical of volunteers or defectors and restrict their use for positive espionage purposes. In some cases, the most valuable spy of all is the â€Å"agent-in-place†, the person who remains in a position of trust with access to highly secret information, but who has been recruited by a foreign intelligence service; such a spy is known as a â€Å"mole†(see Herrington, Stuart A. Traitors among Us: Inside the Spy Catchers World, 1999).            A high-priority espionage target is the penetration of the various international terrorist organizations. If the leadership of such units can be infiltrated by spies, advance knowledge can be obtained of the location and identity of intended victims, the nature of the disguises being used by the hit team, and the secret sources of weapons. Such information could be used to foil terrorist operations. International drug trafficking, it has been asserted, can similarly be thwarted by effective espionage, but the problem is complex, and only limited success has been achieved. How espionages are gathered?            Intelligence work, including spying, proceeds in a five-step process. Initially, what the decision makers need to know is considered, and requirements are set. The second step is collecting the desired information, which requires knowing where the information is located and who can best obtain it. The information may be available in a foreign newspaper, radio broadcast, or other open source; or it may be obtained only by the most sophisticated electronic means, or by planting an agent within the decision-making system of the target area. The third step is intelligence production, in which the collected raw data are assembled, evaluated, and collated into the best possible answer to the question initially asked. The fourth step is communicating the processed information to the decision maker. To be useful, information must be presented in a timely, accurate, and understandable form. The fifth and crucial step is the use of intelligence. The decision maker may choose to ignore the information conveyed, thus possibly courting disaster; on the other hand, a judgment may be made on the basis of information that proves inaccurate (see Hulnick, Arthur S. and Valcourt, Richard R. Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century, 1999).The point is that the decision maker must make the final crucial judgment about whether, or how, to use the information supplied. The intelligence process can fail at each or any of these five basic steps. Espionage Agencies and Networks            The worlds intelligence, espionage, counter-intelligence, and covert action programmes may be said to follow three distinct organizational patterns: the American, the totalitarian (exemplified by the Communist regimes), and the British (parliamentary) systems. Similarities exist among them, yet distinctions are sharp.            In the United States the Central Intelligence Agency continues to sit at the corner of an elaborate complex of some dozen separate intelligence organizations. Each has a specific role and a carefully guarded area of operations. The director of central intelligence is both head of the CIA and the presidents principal intelligence adviser. In the latter job the director theoretically coordinates all the separate intelligence units, setting their requirements, budgets, and operational assignments. In reality, many of the major units in the systemâ€â€such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the huge National Security Agency/Central Security Service, both part of the Department of Defenseâ€â€operate in quasi-independence. The National Security Agency, which engages in code making and code breaking, the science of cryptography, is much larger in staff size and budget than the CIA (see Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John D. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 2001). The military also maintains a major tactical intelligence capability to assist field commanders in making on-the-spot decisions. Other major units in the US intelligence system include the State Departments Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration of the Department of Justice. The US model influenced the intelligence structures of those countries where the United States was dominant at the end of World War II, such as West Germany (now part of the united Federal Republic of Germany), Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.            In contrast to the federated American intelligence structure, the typical totalitarian setup is highly centralized. In the Soviet Union, the power of the KGB pervaded every aspect of national life. Its director was generally a powerful member of the Politburo (the governing political committee of the USSR). The KGB had two chief directorates. The most important was the First Directorate, which was responsible for foreign intelligence gathering. The Second Directorates principal responsibilities involved providing counter-espionage protection to the regime and recruiting foreign agents within the Soviet Union. Its targets included diplomats and journalists stationed in the USSR, foreign students, business people, tourists, and visiting delegations (see Macpherson, Nelson. American Intelligence in War-Time London: The Story of the Oss, 2003).Most Eastern European governments followed the KGB model in their intelligence operations. China, Cuba, and other Communist nations still do.            The third model of intelligence systems is the British, a confederation of agencies coordinated by a Cabinet subcommittee and accountable to the Cabinet and prime minister. The two principal units are the Secret Intelligence Service (often called MI6, signifying â€Å"military intelligence†) and the Security Service (popularly called MI5). These labels reflect the military origins of these services, which are now in the civilian sector. MI6 is similar to the CIA and the KGB in that it carries out espionage, counter-espionage, and covert action overseas. MI5 is charged with domestic counter-intelligence and internal security. Scotland Yard maintains a â€Å"special branch†, which operates as the overt arm of the security service; it makes arrests and offers evidence in espionage cases while MI5 agents remain in the background. A number of specialized units also operate within the British intelligence community. These include the Government Communications Centre (for code making and breaking), the Ministry of Defense intelligence sections, and various Foreign Office intelligence groups. With some national variations, the intelligence services of France, Italy, Israel, and the Commonwealth of Nations countries follow the general British pattern of organization (see Macpherson, Nelson. American Intelligence in War-Time London: The Story of the Oss, 2003). During the 19th century            Political espionage is thought to have first been used systematically by Joseph Fouchà ©, duc dOtrante, minister of police during the French Revolution and the reign of Napoleon. Under Fouchà ©s direction, a network of police agents and professional spies uncovered conspiracies to seize power organized by the Jacobins and by Bourbon Royalist à ©migrà ©s. The Austrian statesman Prince von Metternich also established an efficient organization of political and military spies early in the 19th century. Better known than either of these organizations was the dreaded Okhrana (Department for Defence of Public Security and Order) of the Russian tsars, created in 1825 to uncover opposition to the regime.            During the mid-19th century the secret police of Prussia was reorganized and invested with the duty of safeguarding the external as well as the internal security of the country. The Prussian espionage system played an important part in preparations to unify the German states in the German Empire. It also covered France with a network of about 30,000 agents whose work contributed to the German victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Not until the latter part of the 19th century, however, were permanent intelligence bureaux created by modern states (see T. Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. 1999). Early 20th century            Systematic espionage aided the Japanese in defeating the Russians in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In preparing for World War I the Germans again flooded France with a host of agents, some of whom were disguised as trade representatives, teachers, agricultural labourers, or domestics. The most famous of these agents was Mata Hari, who posed as an Indian dancer in Paris. German agents also engaged in attempts to sabotage American national defense both before and after the US entry into World War I.            Most nations, however, entered World War I with inadequate espionage staffs, and the war was frequently fought on the basis of poor intelligence. The lessons of that war, along with rapid advances in technology, especially in communications and aviation, spurred a major growth in intelligence agencies. This was further stimulated by the advent of Fascist governments in Europe and a military dictatorship in Japan, all of which had expansionist foreign policies and the creation of counter-espionage agencies such as the Gestapo in Nazi Germany. These developments led other, democratic countries to establish counter-espionage systems as well (see Hulnick, Arthur S. and Valcourt, Richard R. Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century. 1999). Espionage during World War II            World War II was the great stimulus to intelligence services worldwide. Modern military and communications technology put a premium on accurate and quick information, as well as on efforts to protect the security of sensitive information. Some of the great battles of World War II were actually intelligence and counter-intelligence battles. Only in recent years have some of the exploits, and failures, in this secret war been disclosed. Notable is Operation Double Cross, in which the British captured practically all the German spies in Great Britain during the war and turned them into double agents who sent false information back to Germany. Also, the British and their allies were able to break the German secret code, providing access to many of the enemys secret transmissions (see Sexton Jr., Donal J. Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Research Guide. 1999).            The surprise attack by Japan on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was a great intelligence success for the Japanese and an intelligence failure for the Americans. That failure stimulated the post-war growth of a massive intelligence apparatus in the United States. Before World War II the United States had virtually no intelligence system; after the war the CIA became world famous for its pervasive international surveillance, joining the MI6, the KGB, the Service de Documentation Extà ©rieure et de Contre-Espionage of France, Israels foreign intelligence agency Mossad, Chinas Social Affairs Department, and numerous other intelligence agencies in a massive network of espionage and counter-espionage efforts (see Sexton Jr., Donal J. Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Research Guide. 1999). Modern Era            In the mid-1970s, as a result of disillusionment with the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and the policies of dà ©tente, many Americans began to question the role of the CIA. Mass-media disclosures of intelligence agency abuses and failures were followed by investigations by presidential commissions and congressional committees, which resulted in new guidelines for secret operations and a new structure for executive and legislative supervision. Controversy over the CIAs role and control remains, however. One result is an ever-increasing amount of public information about intelligence services around the world (see â€Å"Espionage†. Grolier Encyclopedia of Knowledge, pp. 342-347, vol. 5). In Britain, MI5 remained unrecognized by statute until 1989, and MI6 until 1994. Espionage in Politics and Industry            Intelligence and espionage are terms most commonly associated with national foreign policies, yet secret information is needed to make decisions in politics, commerce, and industry. Political parties have always been interested in the strategic plans of their opponents or in any information that might discredit them.            Most large corporate enterprises today have divisions for strategic planning that require intelligence reports. Competitive enterprises are undeniably interested in the plans of their competitors; despite laws against such practices, industrial espionage is difficult to detect and control and is known to be an active tool for gaining such foreknowledge. Many of the tools of government intelligence work are used, including electronic surveillance and aerial photographic reconnaissance, and attempts are even made to recruit defectors (see â€Å"Espionage†. Grolier Encyclopedia of Knowledge, pp. 342-347, vol. 5). Espionage Act of 1917            Espionage Act of 1917 is a principal United States legislation prohibiting espionage for a foreign country and providing heavy penalties for such activity. As amended in 1940 and 1970, it is still in force.            The 1917 law provided steep fines and imprisonment for collecting and transmitting to foreign power information related to US national defense and for interfering with the recruitment or loyalty of the armed forces. Use of the US mail for material urging treason or resistance to US laws was prohibited; sabotage, especially of trading ships, was subjected to severe penalties; the movement of neutral ships in US waters was regulated (in order to stop such vessels from shipping arms or supplies to an enemy country); and the fraudulent use of passports as well as the unauthorized representation of a foreign government were prohibited. An important amendment to the law, usually called the Sedition Act, was passed in 1918 but repealed in 1921; it forbade spoken or printed attacks on the US government, Constitution, or flag (see â€Å"Intelligence†. New Standard Encyclopedia, pp. 431-437, vol. 7).            During the outbreak of public hysteria following the US entry into World War I, the 1917 and 1918 laws permitted about 1,500 trials and prison sentences; freedom of the press was curtailed. In 1919 this led US Supreme Court justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Louis Brandeis to state the principle, later much cited, that unpatriotic speech and publications were illegal only if they constituted a â€Å"clear and present danger†to national security.            The 1940 revision of the Espionage Act increased its penalties. The application of the law to propaganda was limited by a Supreme Court decision in 1944. During World War II about 160 people were convicted under the Espionage Act. Also under this act, the American Communists Julius Rosenberg and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of spying and executed in 1953 (see â€Å"Intelligence†. New Standard Encyclopedia, pp. 431-437, vol. 7). Central Intelligence Agency            Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), agency of the Executive Office of the President of the United States, created in 1947, together with the National Security Council. The CIA is Americas first permanent peacetime intelligence agency responsible for keeping the government informed of foreign actions affecting the nations interests. It was established by the National Security Act of 1947 and is charged with coordinating all US intelligence activities, as well as such functions and duties related to intelligence as directed by the National Security Council (see Darling, Arthur B. The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950. 2002). A director and deputy director of the agency are appointed by the president with the consent of the Senate (see Hulnick, Arthur S. and Valcourt, Richard R. Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century, 1999). History            The CIAs original mission was primarily intelligence gathering, but after Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe and mainland China, the National Security Council directed that the agency engage in political, covert psychological, paramilitary, and economic operations. United States participation in the Korean War (1950-1953) placed additional requirements on the CIA to support the combat forces.            In the period from 1953 to 1961 the CIA was at the height of its cold war activities, carrying out continuous foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence, political action, and propaganda operations. In late 1961 the CIA was reorganized to put more emphasis on science, technology, and internal management. The agency was heavily committed in the war in South East Asia. In 1963 an Office of National Intelligence Programs Evaluation was established to coordinate community activities; this was replaced in 1972 by an Intelligence Community Staff (see Lowenthal, Mark M. U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy, 1999). Activities            The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is divided into four main directorates, or branches. The Directorate of Operations conducts covert activities around the world. The Directorate of Science and Technology interprets data gathered from electronic transmissions, spy satellites, and other sources. The Directorate of Intelligence produces analyses for policy makers by synthesizing information from the CIA and other federal agencies. The Directorate of Administration oversees the agencys finances and personnel and monitors internal security.            The activities of the CIA are many and varied. Clandestine collection of vital information that cannot be obtained by any overt means requires recruiting agents who can obtain the needed intelligence without detection. Intelligence reports from all sources are reviewed by analysts who produce studies ranging from basic surveys to estimates of future developments. Current intelligence of major importance is detailed in daily, weekly, or monthly bulletins. Periodic projections concerning key nations are presented as national intelligence estimates (see Lowenthal, Mark M. U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy, 1999).            The CIA is also responsible for counter-espionage activities. Its mission is to prevent the placement of foreign agents in sensitive US agencies; domestically this work is coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).            Covert political operations have ranged from subsidizing friendly foreign politicians, parties, or pressure groups to providing assistance in combating subversion. Paramilitary operations support certain exile forces with training and equipment; one example was the CIAs support of Cuban exiles before and during the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.            Modern technology has increased the capabilities of intelligence collection. In the 1960s high-altitude aircraft introduced a new era of aerial photography; this was quickly followed by transmissions from space satellites. Similarly, underseas intelligence work was advanced by vessels capable of raising a submarine from great depths (see Lowenthal, Mark M. U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy, 1999). Controversy and investigations            All clandestine activities are considered abhorrent by some people. Many, however, recognize secret intelligence collection necessary to protect national security. Generally, people support covert political activities in times of crisis.            The role of the CIA director as the principal US intelligence officer and coordinator of activities of the other agencies has often been in dispute. Over the years frequent proposals have been made to divest the head of the CIA of the coordinating role and assign that function to a member of the White House staff.            The CIA has been investigated a number of times by various task force groups, one of which in 1949 recommended major reorganization of CIA operations. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, President John F. Kennedy appointed a group to analyze the failure.            In 1975 the CIA came under extensive Congressional and White House examination. It was found that the agency had been engaged in â€Å"unlawful†domestic spying activities and had been implicated in assassination attempts abroad. As a result of these investigations, permanent Congressional committees were established to oversee CIA operations. By 1980 these committees had exclusive jurisdiction over review of CIA activities (see Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John D. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 2001).            By 1986, however, the agency was involved in a new controversy concerning the secret sale of arms to Iran and the disbursement of monies from the sale to the rebels (known as the Contras) fighting the government of Nicaragua. The late CIA director William J. Casey, among others, was suspected of being implicated in the arms scandal. As the 1990s began, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the dissolution of the USSR led the CIA to revise its mission and organization to meet changing world conditions.            The United States government released the first of three batches of classified documents expected to shed light on relations between Chile and the United States during the 1970s in June 1999. These documents included reports by the Central Intelligence Agency referring to covert operations intended to promote a military coup and overturn the government of President Allende.            There was further criticism for the CIA after the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, when it was accused of not having done enough to warn of, and possibly prevent, the impending disaster. Over the following months the organization was subsequently given extra powers and resources to conduct increased covert operations as part of the war on terrorism; it also began to develop closer ties with the FBI (see T. Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. 1999). Conclusion Implications of Modern Technology            All forms and techniques of intelligence are now aided by an accelerating technology of communications and a variety of computing and measuring devices. Miniaturized cameras and microfilm have made it easier for people engaged in all forms of espionage to photograph secret documents and conceal the films. Artificial satellites also have an espionage functionâ€â€that of aerial photography for such purposes as detecting secret military installations. Information held or programmes running on computers are vulnerable to penetration by hackers, whether acting independently or for other bodies. The vanguard of these developments is highly secret, but it is known that telephones can be tapped without wires, rooms can be bugged (planted with electronic listening and recording devices) without entry, and photographs can be made in the dark. Of course this same technology is used in countermeasures, and the competition escalates between those seeking secret information and those trying to protect it.            In foreign embassies in sensitive areas, confidential discussions routinely take place in plastic bubbles encasing secure rooms, to protect the confidentiality of information. Intelligence agencies have long been known to be staffed with expert lip readers. Privacy of communications remains under constant assault by technological developments that offer threats to, but perhaps also promises for, human progress. References C. S. Trahair, Richard. Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies and Secret Operations, 2004. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT. T. Richelson, Jeffrey. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. 1999. Oxford University Press, New York. Carney, Ralph M. Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal. 2001. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. Bungert, Heike Et Al. Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. 2003. Frank Cass. London. Herrington, Stuart A. Traitors among Us: Inside the Spy Catchers World, 1999. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John D. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, 2001. Dell, New York. Hulnick, Arthur S. and Valcourt, Richard R. Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century, 1999. Praeger, Westport, CT. Sexton Jr., Donal J. Signals Intelligence in World War II: A Research Guide. 1999. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT. Darling, Arthur B. The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950. 2002. Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA. Macpherson, Nelson. American Intelligence in War-Time London: The Story of the Oss, 2003. Frank Cass, London. Hulnick, Arthur S. and Valcourt, Richard R. Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century, 1999. Praeger, Westport, CT. â€Å"Espionage†. Grolier Encyclopedia of Knowledge, pp. 342-347, vol. 5. â€Å"Intelligence†. New Standard Encyclopedia, pp. 431-437, vol. 7. Lowenthal, Mark M. U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy, 1999. Praeger, Westport, CT.
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